Inside Russia’s €150 million propaganda blitz to undermine Moldova’s EU path

Russia has launched an unprecedented propaganda campaign in Moldova, a small post-Soviet nation of 2.5 million people bordering Ukraine. Moscow’s influence in Moldova remains significant, primarily due to two factors: the breakaway region of Transnistria, where Russia has maintained troops for over 30 yearsrs, and the pro-Russian autonomous region of Gagauzia.

The Kremlin is investing millions to sway two crucial October votes in Moldova: the presidential election and a referendum on enshrining Moldova’s European future in its constitution. While Russia shows less concern for the presidential race, where the popular incumbent Maia Sandu is likely to be re-elected, it is heavily focused on influencing the referendum’s outcome.

To this end, Russia has flooded Moldova with money, buying influence among politicians, journalists, social media influencers, voters, and civil servants. Sergiy Sydorenko from European Pravda discussed these developments with Valeriu Pasha, head of the Moldovan think tank WatchDog.MD. We bring you a summary of the discussion.

The Kremlin’s strategy: control through chaos

Russia’s approach in Moldova isn’t about backing specific candidates for leadership positions. Instead, it’s pursuing a broader strategy aimed at total control.

“For the Kremlin, this is a war where the goal is complete control of the territory, not just influence,” explains Valeriu Pasha. This hybrid attack on Moldova is part of Russia’s larger war against Ukraine and Western democracies.

In line with Russia’s foreign policy doctrine, post-Soviet countries are viewed as “lost territories” to be reclaimed by any means necessary. Belarus is a model of this strategy’s success, where the country remains nominally independent but has lost decision-making sovereignty.

“Belarus is Russia’s role model for Moldova, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and likely Central Asia,” Pasha notes.

With Moldova’s pro-Western leadership, Russia risks losing influence over the country within the next decade or two.

The Kremlin’s tactics: buying influence

The Kremlin exploits Moldova’s vulnerabilities, particularly its weak institutions and ineffective justice system. While Russia employs various tactics, including espionage, its primary tool in Moldova is widespread bribery.

“Russian intelligence can easily bring money into the country to influential politicians, journalists, influencers, voters, and civil servants,” the expert says.

Rather than emphasizing the Russian World concept — a geopolitical ideology promoting the Russian language, culture, and interests in former Soviet states —the focus is on fostering a corrupt system the focus is on fostering a corrupt system. The success of politicians who embrace corruption aligns with the Kremlin’s objectives, as these figures are more likely to seek support from Russia than the EU.

“The Kremlin is primarily buying influence. Unfortunately, this strategy is proving quite effective,” Pasha notes.

For Russia, Moldova’s referendum is the real battle

The upcoming referendum in Moldova has greater significance than the presidential election. While President Maia Sandu’s re-election seems likely, the referendum could shape Moldova’s future for years. Any future reversal would require another referendum and constitutional amendment, a high bar for pro-Russian factions.

“Moldovan law stipulates that referendum results automatically become part of the Constitution,” the analyst explains. “It would enshrine EU membership as Moldova’s strategic foreign policy goal and define procedures for adopting EU treaties.”

Polls indicate that most Moldovans support EU membership, with the pro-EU diaspora vote playing a crucial role. However, Russia is attempting to manipulate public opinion through various tactics:

• Framing the referendum as a vote on Sandu’s leadership rather than EU integration
• Arguing that the referendum is premature or dangerous due to Russian propaganda
• Aiming to confuse voters and reduce turnout, as the referendum requires participation from at least one-third of eligible voters, with over 50% voting in favor.

“The Kremlin fears the demoralization of its support base in Moldova,” Pasha notes. “That’s why about 70% of their information attacks target the referendum, with only 30% aimed at Maia Sandu.”

A clear pro-EU result would set Moldova on the path to European integration and significantly weaken Russia’s influence.

“If pro-Russian Moldovans see a decisive loss in the referendum, they’ll realize there’s no chance of steering Moldova back towards Russia,” the expert adds.

Moscow’s two puppets in Moldova

Russia operates in Moldova primarily through two sanctioned fugitive oligarchs:

1. Ilan Shorleader of the Shor Party, was sentenced in absentia to 15 years for the “theft of the century” – a billion-dollar bank fraud.
2. Vlad Plahotniuca former Democratic Party leader once dubbed “master of Moldova,” is also accused of this fraud scheme.

These stolen funds allegedly financed pro-Russian protests and unrest in Moldova.

“Shor is Russia’s main tool for funneling money into Moldova,” Pasha explains. “Russia is spending at least €100 million this year on influence operations here, including voter bribes and media sponsorship. At least ten out of 18 presidential candidates are supported by Russia.”

The Victory Bloc, created in Moscow in April 2024, exemplifies this influence. Comprising five Shor-controlled parties, it held its first congress in Moscow’s Carlton Hotel, spending €5 million on a one-day event.

“They bring thousands from Moldova, paying for flights and accommodation. With such money, one could win elections for ten years, but they’re spending it in days,” Pasha notes.

He contrasts this with the €9 million of Russian money allocated for Igor Dodon’s entire 2020 presidential campaign, which was considered substantial at the time. Dodon, Putin’s ally and former president, leads Moldova’s second-most popular party.

Russian funding flows through Promsvyazbank, which finances the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine, suggesting these efforts might be part of Russia’s military budget.

“Russia will spend about 1% of our GDP on influence and election bribes in Moldova this year,” the analyst concludes, estimating around €150 million.

From TV to TikTok

Despite Moldova’s official ban on Russian television, some residents still access it via the internet and satellite. In Gagauzia, several cable providers illegally rebroadcast Russian channels.

Pro-Russian propaganda persists through other means. Dozens of opinion leaders and politicians echo Kremlin talking points on local media. The internet, especially Telegram and TikTok, has become the primary propaganda tool.

“The worst is on TikTok, where moderation is lax, and people can spread anything for money,” Pasha explains. “TikTok’s audience is the least discerning and least capable of distinguishing fake news.”

Oligarchs spend tens of thousands of euros monthly on ads across social media platforms, with minimal intervention from Meta. Some journalists in mainstream TV channels may receive additional payments to pursue pro-Russian agendas.

The influence campaign extends beyond politicians. Prosecutors, judges, and former high-ranking civil servants opposed the current government and reforms and attempted to sway public opinion using their own funds.

Ukraine is not the enemy

Even Moldova’s key pro-Russian figures avoid labeling Ukraine as an enemy, recognizing that such rhetoric lacks voter support. Instead, the popular Kremlin narratives include:

• “Moldova is following Ukraine’s dangerous path”
• “The West is using Ukraine in a war against Russia”
• “Moldova is being dragged into the war.”

“The main propaganda line is that President Sandu will drag Moldova into a war in Transnistria right after the elections,” the expert explains.

Despite these efforts, public opinion shows positive trends, with a growing likelihood that the EU integration referendum will pass with a solid majority.

“Moldova has long been a target of Russian propaganda, but it remains aligned with Ukraine and Europe,” Pasha concludes.

While the upcoming referendum is significant, Russia’s main focus is next summer’s parliamentary elections. Polls suggest Russia could secure four to five aligned parties in the next parliament.

“Moldova is a parliamentary republic,” Pasha explains. “If Sandu doesn’t have a pro-European parliament’s support, his power will be limited. The Kremlin understands this well.”

He parallels Igor Dodon’s presidency: “Dodon was a Kremlin puppet, but without parliamentary support, he could do little for Russia.”

“The Russians are trying to turn Maia Sandu into a similar political ‘impotent,’”“ Pasha notes.

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